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 In a recent issue of this Journal, Carr and Mathewson (1988) test a
 model of the impact of limited and unlimited liability regimes on the
 nature of firms by comparing the performance of law firms operated
 as partnerships and sole proprietorships (and therefore subject to
 unlimited liability) with that of law firms operated as corporations
 (and therefore subject to limited liability).' In their model, "unlimited
 liability by raising the cost of ownership rights discourages investment
 in the firm, causing legal firms to be inefficiently small" (p. 779). The
 peculiar history of organizational form in the legal profession seemed
 to provide an opportunity to test their model's prediction. Prior to
 the 1960s, state law prevented law firms from incorporating, with the
 effect that unlimited liability was mandated. During the 1960s and
 early 1970s, a large number of states passed statutes that allowed law
 and other professional service firms to incorporate, thereby giving
 such firms the option to elect either an unlimited or a limited liability
 regime. The result was a universe that included some law firms that
 were subject to unlimited liability and some that were subject to lim-
 ited liability.
 Carr and Mathewson test their model's prediction that law firms
 would reach a larger, more efficient size under a limited liability re-
 gime by using 1972 and 1977 census data to compare firm size based
 on liability status. Consistent with their model's prediction, they re-
 port "that liability status significantly affects law firm size: a change
 in liability status from unlimited to limited increases the average law
 firm size in 1972 (as measured by annual receipts) by approximately
 $79,000 (in 1972 dollars) or 48 percent. A similar result flows from
 the 1977 data" (p. 781).
 While their use of a convenient change in the state regulation of
 I am grateful to Joseph Bankman, William Klein, Myron Scholes, and an anonymous
 referee for comments on an earlier draft of this comment.
 ' The authors also test their model using data on Scottish banking between 1795 and
 1882. My comments (and expertise) are limited to their discussion of law firms.
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 law firm organization to test their model is quite clever, the absence
 of deeper inquiry into the institutional setting in which that change
 took place may have resulted in the authors' getting the direction of
 causation exactly backward. Rather than a change in liability status
 causing better economic performance, as Carr and Mathewson posit,
 it is more likely the case that, for law firms, better economic perfor-
 mance caused the change in liability status.
 Central to understanding the pattern of law firm incorporation in
 the United States is that the choice is income tax, not liability, driven.
 Prior to the 1960s, state law did not allow corporations to render
 professional services. This put professionals at a substantial tax disad-
 vantage compared with corporate employees. Most important, the
 Internal Revenue Code authorized corporations that adopted pen-
 sion and profit-sharing plans to currently deduct contributions to
 such plans, while excluding the contributions from employee income
 and exempting from tax the income earned by the plans (Munnell
 1982, pp. 30-61). Sole proprietors and partners had much more
 limited recourse to these benefits.2
 Professionals sought to avoid this disadvantage by arguing under
 familiar tax principles that their firms, although not corporations,
 were "associations taxable as corporations" and therefore were enti-
 tled to favorable corporate tax treatment for their pension and profit-
 sharing plans. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) resisted these ef-
 forts until, in United States v. Kintner (216 F.2d 418 [9th Cir. 1954]),
 the Court of Appeals held that the IRS could not deny corporate tax
 status to an association of physicians when the association had the
 primary characteristics, although not the actual form, of a corpora-
 tion. The IRS grudgingly acquiesced to the court's position by adopt-
 ing regulations that allowed professional associations to be taxed as
 corporations, but only if state law permitted such associations certain
 characteristics of a corporation (Treasury regulations secs. 301.7701-1
 to 301.7701-3 [1960]). It was in response to these regulations that
 states adopted statutes authorizing incorporation by professional
 firms, thereby assuring them the availability of favorable tax treat-
 ment (Cavitch 1988, p. 81-8). Limited liability simply was not a
 factor.3
 2 While the treatment of pension plans is the most significant tax benefit from incor-
 poration, other benefits also exist. These include the ability to provide group life
 insurance of up to $50,000 per employee and medical expense reimbursement pay-
 ments, in both cases with the premiums and payments deductible by the corporation
 and nontaxable to the employee (Cavitch 1988, pp. 81-3-81-4).
 3 Indeed, different states provide quite different amounts of limited liability to pro-
 fessional corporations. In particular, some statutes, such as those of Wisconsin and
 Maine, provide that a professional shareholder is liable for the acts of other sharehold-
 ers to the same extent as if the shareholder were a partner (Eaton and Church 1987,
 pp. 9-44.2-9-46).
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 With that background, the result that the value of the tax benefits
 provided by incorporation increases with the success and therefore
 the size of the firm flows straightforwardly from two facts. First, dur-
 ing the period at issue, the tax rates applicable to lawyers' income
 were highly progressive and for part of the period reached a top
 marginal rate of 70 percent.4 Second, the empirical evidence concern-
 ing law firm profitability strongly suggests that profit per partner is
 positively correlated with firm size.
 With a focus on increased pension contributions, the most impor-
 tant tax advantage of incorporation, the tax value of incorporating is
 given by multiplying the increase in allowable pension contribution
 that results from incorporation by the individual partner's marginal
 tax rate. If partners in large firms earn more than partners in small
 firms, then their marginal tax rates are higher than those of partners
 in small firms, and the tax value of incorporation is greater for large
 firms. My result-that success leads to limited liability rather than, as
 Carr and Mathewson posit, limited liability leading to success-
 follows.
 Suppose that a large firm earns $100,000 per partner and that each
 partner's marginal tax rate is 70 percent. For the large firm, the value
 of the increased pension deduction resulting from incorporation is
 $5,250 per partner.5 Now suppose that a small firm earns only
 $50,000 per partner and that each partner's marginal rate is only
 35 percent.6 For the small firm, the value of the increased pension
 deduction resulting from incorporation is only $1,312 per partner.7
 The difference in the tax value of incorporation between large and
 small firms results from the proportional increase in tax savings due
 to the large firm's greater profit per partner and the more than pro-
 portional increase in tax savings due to the large-firm partners'
 higher marginal tax rate.
 I The Tax Reform Act of 1969 reduced the top marginal rate for earned income to
 60 percent for 1970 and to 50 percent for 1971 and thereafter.
 5 On these assumptions, the pension contribution per partner allowed an incorpo-
 rated firm is roughly $20,000 and that allowed an unincorporated firm is roughly
 $12,500. The value of incorporating is 70 percent of the difference.
 6 These tax rates were chosen to illustrate the point. I have not tried to select rates
 that were in place at one time or another during the relevant period. In all events, as
 long as the rate structure is progressive, the outcome is the same.
 7For incorporated small firms, the tax value of the pension contribution is $3,500,
 assuming $50,000 of earnings that is paid out 80 percent ($40,000) as salary and 20
 percent ($10,000) as pension contribution, with a 35 percent marginal income tax rate
 for partners. For unincorporated small firms, the tax value of the pension contribution
 is $2,283, assuming the same earnings but paid out, as in n. 5, 87.5 percent ($43,750)
 as salary (reflecting the lower maximum contribution allowed unincorporated entities)
 and 12.5 percent ($6,250) as pension contribution, with a 35 percent marginal income
 tax rate for partners. The tax value of incorporation is $1,312 ($3,500 - $2,188).
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 TABLE 1
 PARTNER COMPENSATION AS A FUNCTION OF FIRM SIZE (1982)
 Total as
 a Percentage of
 Number of Number of Average for
 Attorneys Firms Average Total Firms with
 in Firm in Sample Compensation ($) 2-6 Attorneys
 2-6 180 67,184 100
 7-11 94 82,174 122
 12-19 104 91,813 137
 20-39 90 104,124 155
 40 or more 62 118,173 176
 SOURCE.-Altman & Weil (1982), pp. 71-72.
 Thus as long as profits per partner are higher in larger firms, the
 tax advantages of incorporation are more valuable to larger firms.
 Both direct evidence and inferential evidence are available on this
 point. Both support the proposition that partners in large firms earn
 more than partners in small firms.
 The direct evidence shows that, for example, in 1982 the average
 compensation per partner in firms with 40 or more lawyers was 76
 percent greater than that received by partners in firms with from two
 to six attorneys. The overall pattern suggests a direct relation between
 firm size and partner compensation, as shown in table 1. This pattern
 is explained by the indirect evidence. A primary determinant of profit
 per partner in law firms is leverage-the ratio of employee lawyers
 to partners (Maister 1982, pp. 15, 18; Gilson and Mnookin 1989,
 pp. 584-85). Of the 100 most successful corporate firms for 1987,
 differences in leverage explain 34.3 percent of the differences among
 the firms in profitability per partner (Gilson and Mnookin 1989, p.
 585). Thus larger firms that are capable of supporting a number of
 employee lawyers for each partner will generate more profit per part-
 ner than smaller firms whose partners are not similarly leveraged.8
 The more plausible relationship between firm size and liability re-
 gime, then, is precisely the opposite of what Carr and Mathewson
 posit. Choosing to incorporate may not result in increased law firm
 size. Rather, the tax benefits from incorporating are more valuable
 to members of successful, growing firms. As a result, they are more
 likely to incorporate for tax reasons and, only incidentally, to elect a
 8 Gilson and Mnookin (1985, pp. 357-71) discuss additional explanations for the
 relationship between firm size and profit per partner, including the proposition that
 the more firm-specific capital invested in the firm, the larger the bond of the quality
 of the firm's work.
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 limited liability regime. The lesson from this mistake is important.
 When the subject of empirical research is firm organization, under-
 standing the institutional context is critical, and the tax system is likely
 to be an important element of that context. It simply may be a good
 idea to run your research design by your tax lawyer.9
 That still leaves the question that Carr and Mathewson really would
 like to answer: Is it possible to test for the importance of liability
 regime as a motive for law firm incorporation despite the importance
 of the tax system? In fact, it is possible to test directly the relative
 importance of taxes and liability regime on incorporation. Different
 states provide incorporated law firms with quite different limits on
 liability: for example, some states provide lawyers in incorporated law
 firms no protection against liability while others provide complete
 protection against all but an individual lawyer's own malpractice. Be-
 cause the tax benefits to incorporation are uniform across states
 whereas the extent of limited liability differs, the rate of incorpora-
 tion should be higher in states that provide more extensive liability
 protection if liability regime matters. In their reply to this comment
 (this issue), Carr and Mathewson report that they tested this hypothe-
 sis by reexamining their data in light of a classification of states based
 on the extent of liability protection provided by each state at the time
 to which their data sets relate. The results show no significant relation
 between extent of liability protection and incorporation, a result con-
 sistent with tax-driven incorporation but inconsistent with liability-
 driven incorporation.'0
 9 To be sure, the tax advantages of incorporation do not explain why a substantial
 number of firms nonetheless have remained partnerships, thereby choosing to pay
 higher taxes. The point can be deflected by noting that Carr and Mathewson's limited
 liability explanation suffers from the same defect. The same firms that choose higher
 effective tax rates also choose unlimited, not limited, liability. More directly, while this
 is not the occasion to work out a complete account of the costs that might offset the
 tax benefits of incorporation, two sorts come to mind. First, Fama and Jensen (1983)
 argue that professional partnerships maintain unlimited liability as a bond of the unob-
 servable quality of their services. In some cases, the tax (and liability) benefits of incor-
 poration may be outweighed by the cost of giving up the bond. Second, one effect of
 a pension plan is to impose a uniform savings rate on all partners. When a firm is
 composed of individuals of differing ages and wealth, unanimity may not exist among
 the partners concerning the appropriate savings rate, even when tax savings are taken
 into account. While side payments between partners might facilitate the optimal out-
 come, the transaction cost barriers to agreement may be substantial.
 10 Pursuant to the suggestion of an anonymous referee, Carr and Mathewson and I
 divided the labor necessary to pursue this test: I provided the state-by-state classifica-
 tion and they undertook the statistical analysis. Thus errors in classification by me
 would affect their results. I am informed by Carr and Mathewson that my classification
 differs from their original delineation of limited and unlimited liability states; however,
 I do not understand that the analysis based on their original classification shows any
 greater relation between liability protection and incorporation. Two other approaches
 to testing the importance of limited liability as a motive for law firm incorporation in
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 light of the tax system come to mind. The first focuses on sole proprietors: one-lawyer
 firms. Incorporation by these firms cannot result in limited liability because under all
 state professional incorporation statutes the professional actually rendering services
 on behalf of the corporation remains personally liable. Thus all incorporations by sole
 proprietors must be tax motivated. It would be interesting to see whether the rate of
 incorporation differed between sole proprietorships and multilawyer firms. If limited
 liability is an important factor in the incorporation decision, the incorporation rate for
 multilawyer firms should be higher. (However, tax effects may cause this outcome
 to be overdetermined as well because increased size will increase the tax benefits of
 incorporation for multilawyer firms as well as the liability benefits.) The second ap-
 proach builds on changes in the tax law. Beginning with the Tax Equity and Fiscal
 Responsibility Act of 1982 and accelerating with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax
 benefits from operating a professional firm as a corporation have been dramatically
 reduced (Blackburn 1988). Some light may be shed on the relative importance of tax
 and liability motives for professional incorporation by examining both the rates of
 incorporation since 1982 as compared with prior periods and the number of profes-
 sional corporations that have chosen to disincorporate-return to an unlimited liability
 regime-since 1982.
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